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Over the years, practical intelligence, social intelligence, and especially emotional intelligence have 
received substantial attention in the academic and practitioner literatures. However, at the same 
time, these individual difference “constructs” have also fueled controversies and criticisms, including 
their applications to employee selection. It is without doubt that their defi nition, dimensionality, 
and operationalization (measurement) have been much more questioned as compared with the more 
traditional or established constructs (i.e. cognitive ability, personality) in this section of the book.
This chapter has two main objectives. The fi rst objective is to review and clarify the conceptual-
ization and measurement of these three constructs (or categories of constructs). In doing so, we aim 
to identify commonalities and differences among the three constructs. The second objective is to 
advance research on practical, social, and emotional intelligence. We aim to achieve both objectives 
by placing the three intelligence constructs in an integrative conceptual framework that relates them 
to traditional individual difference constructs and critical criterion constructs. We end by proposing 
fi ve strategies for future research.
DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTUALIZATIONS
In this section, we review how practical, emotional, and social intelligence have been conceptualized 
and the research that attempted to empirically test these conceptualizations.
PRACTICAL INTELLIGENCE
Sternberg and colleagues introduced the construct of practical intelligence in the mid- to late-1980s 
(Sternberg, 1988; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). As a common thread running through the various 
defi nitions of practical intelligence, it is generally considered to refer to the ability of an individual 
to deal with the problems and situations of everyday life (Bowman, Markham, & Roberts, 2001). 
In lay terms, it can be characterized as “intuition” or “common sense,” and it is often referred to as 
“street smart” to contrast with “book smart,” which is used to characterize traditional analytical or 
academic intelligence.
A central element in practical intelligence is tacit knowledge. Sternberg, Wagner, Williams, and 
Horvath (1995) defi ned tacit knowledge as “action-orientated knowledge, acquired without direct 
help from others, that allows individuals to achieve goals they personally value” (p. 916). This 
defi nition encompasses the key characteristics of tacit knowledge (see Hedlund et al., 2003). First, 
tacit knowledge is diffi cult to articulate because it is not formalized in explicit procedures and rules. 
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Second, tacit knowledge is typically procedural knowledge, telling people how to act in various 
situations. Third, individuals acquire tacit knowledge on the basis of their own everyday experience 
related to a specifi c domain. Thus, tacit knowledge is not formally taught. Fourth, tacit knowledge 
is practical because it enables individuals to obtain the goals that they value in life. These charac-
teristics exemplify the claim of practical intelligence and tacit knowledge being constructs that are 
conceptually distinct from academic intelligence, technical job knowledge, or personality.
Research by Sternberg and colleagues as well as by others have found some support for or at least 
produced fi ndings consistent with some of these claims. First, tacit knowledge seems to increase with 
experience. For example, business managers received higher tacit knowledge scores than business 
graduate students, who in turn outperformed undergraduate students although sample sizes in these 
groups were often small (Wagner, 1987). Second, scores on tacit knowledge inventories showed 
low correlations (below .20) with measures of fl uid and crystallized intelligence (Legree, Heffner, 
Psotka, Martin, & Medsker, 2003; Tan & Libby, 1997). Finally, Bowman et al. (2001) reviewed 
research on tacit knowledge in organizational, educational, and military settings and concluded that 
the assessment of tacit knowledge has certain promise for predicting performance in these real-world 
environments, although the level of prediction does not reach the values obtained with g (see also 
Van Rooy, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Ones, 2006).
Bowman et al. (2001) leveled various criticisms with respect to the construct of practical 
intelligence. From a conceptual point of view, questions have been raised whether practical 
intelligence (tacit knowledge) at all exists as a single construct that is different from other types 
of intelligence, job knowledge, and personality (see also Gottfredson, 2003; McDaniel & Whetzel, 
2005). In particular, McDaniel and Whetzel (2005) put various claims related to practical intelligence 
(tacit knowledge) to the test. To this end, they used research related to situational judgment tests 
(SJTs), a measurement method that is closely related to tacit knowledge inventories (see below). 
Consistent with research by Sternberg and colleagues, McDaniel and Whetzel concluded that such 
tests predict job performance and have incremental validity over more common selection procedures. 
However, they argued that there was no support for the other claims. Specifi cally, they cited studies 
showing that SJTs of practical intelligence were factorial complex and could not be represented by a 
general factor in factor analytic studies and studies showing that these test scores were signifi cantly 
related to scores on established constructs such as g, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and 
agreeableness. Later in this chapter, we argue that such criticisms are right and wrong—they are 
right that practical intelligence is not a unitary construct, but they are wrong to conclude that 
the factorially complex results and signifi cant correlations with established constructs imply that 
practical intelligence is not a distinct and valid construct.
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Since the mid-1990s, emotional intelligence is probably the psychological construct that has 
received the greatest attention in practitioner and academic literatures. Generally, a distinction is 
made between two conceptualizations of emotional intelligence; namely, an ability emotional intel-
ligence model and a trait emotional intelligence model (e.g., Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2007).
The fi rst model conceptualizes emotional intelligence as an ability akin to cognitive ability 
and measures it via performance-based tests. In this paradigm, emotional intelligence is viewed 
as another legitimate type of intelligence. Hence, this model is also referred to as emotional cogni-
tive ability or information processing emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence is then defi ned 
as “the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ emotions, to discriminate among them, and to 
use the information to guide one’s thinking and actions” (Salovey & Mayer, 1990, p. 189). This 
defi nition shows that the higher order construct of emotional intelligence is broken down into four 
branches. The fi rst branch—emotional identifi cation, perception, and expression—deals with the 
ability to accurately perceive emotions in others’ verbal and nonverbal behavior. Emotional facili-
tation of thought is the second branch, referring to the ability to use emotions to assist thinking and 
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problem-solving. Third, emotional understanding denotes the ability to analyze feelings, discriminate 
among emotions, and think about their outcomes. Finally, emotional management deals with abili-
ties related to maintaining or changing emotions.
The second model, the trait EQ model, views emotional intelligence as akin to personality and 
assesses it via self-report. In this model, emotional intelligence is defi ned as “an array of non-
cognitive capabilities, competencies, and skills that infl uence one’s ability to succeed in coping 
with environmental demands and pressures” (Bar-On, 1997, p. 16). As the name suggests, this 
model uses a broad defi nition of emotional intelligence. Abilities such as emotion perception are 
typically combined with noncognitive competencies, skills, and personality traits. For example, 
one of the most popular mixed models (Bar-On, 1997) measures fi ve broad factors and 15 facets: 
(a) intrapersonal (self-regard, emotional self awareness, assertiveness, independence, and self-
actualization), (b) interpersonal (empathy, social responsibility, interpersonal relationship), (c) stress 
management (stress tolerance and impulse control), (d) adaptability (reality testing, fl exibility, and 
problem solving), and (e) general mood (optimism and happiness). In the Goleman (1995) model, 
a similar expanded defi nition of emotional intelligence is used, referring to emotional intelligence 
as a set of learned competencies. Emotional intelligence competence is then defi ned as “an ability 
to recognize, understand, and use emotional information about oneself or others that leads to or 
causes effective or superior performance” (Boyatzis & Sala, 2004, p. 149). A distinction is further 
made between fi ve main competency clusters (with various subcompetencies): self-awareness, 
self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skills. Given the trait-like nature of the mixed 
model, some researchers have suggested using terms such as “trait emotional intelligence,” 
“emotional self-effi cacy” (Petrides & Furnham, 2003), or “emotional self-confi dence” (Roberts, 
Schulze, Zeidner, & Matthews, 2005).
Recent meta-analytic research (Van Rooy, Viswesvaran, & Pluta, 2005) has demonstrated 
that these two models are not measuring the same constructs. Measures based on the two models 
correlated only .14 with one another. In addition, these two models had different correlates. 
Emotional intelligence measures based on the mixed model overlapped considerably with personality 
trait scores but not with cognitive ability. Conversely, emotional intelligence measures developed 
according to an emotional intelligence ability model correlated more with cognitive ability and less 
with personality. Other research has clarifi ed that ability model measures correlate especially with 
verbal (crystallized) ability, with correlations typically between .30 and .40 (Mayer, Roberts, & 
Barsade, 2008). Hence, some have posited that the term “emotional intelligence” should be replaced 
by the term “emotional knowledge” (Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2004).
In addition to the construct validity of emotional intelligence, the criterion-related validity has 
also been scrutinized. Van Rooy and Viswesvaran (2004) conducted a meta-analysis of emotional 
intelligence measures (collapsing both models) for predicting performance. Their analysis of 
59 independent empirical samples obtained a mean corrected correlation of .23. The validity of 
emotional intelligence measures was .24, .10, and .24 for predicting performance in occupational, 
academic, and life settings, respectively. However, a caveat is in order when interpreting the results 
of this meta-analysis as it included only a small number of studies using ability-based emotional 
intelligence instruments and a sizable number of studies using self-report measures of performance. 
Thus, we are still far from being at the point of rending a decision as to the incremental value of 
emotional intelligence for selection purposes. However, in recent years, more positive conclusions 
regarding the validity of emotional intelligence for predicting performance have been drawn. For 
instance, Druskat and Jordan (2007) reviewed 26 studies that examined the validity of emotional 
intelligence (both models) for predicting performance at the individual, team, and leadership level. 
Importantly, all of the studies reviewed were published in peer-reviewed journals. The overall 
conclusion was that “emotional intelligence predicts work performance over and above measures of 
personality and general mental ability” (p. 2).
Despite this recent optimism, there are conceptual and methodological problems associated 
with the research on emotional intelligence. Most criticisms were directed at the mixed model 
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(Mayer et al., 2008). First, the ambiguous (all-encompassing) defi nition and the very broad content 
of the mixed model have been criticized (e.g., Landy, 2005; Locke, 2005; Matthews, Roberts, & Zeidner, 
2004). For example, Landy (2005) succinctly noted: “The construct [of emotional intelligence] and 
the operational defi nitions of the construct (i.e., the actual measurement instruments) are moving 
targets” (p. 419). Similarly, Locke (2005) posited that “The concept of EI [emotional intelligence] 
has now become so broad and the components so variegated that no one concept could possible 
encompass or integrate all of them, no matter what the concept was called; it is no longer even an 
intelligible concept” (p. 426).
Another criticism relates to redundancy of the mixed model with Big Five personality traits. 
For instance, De Raad (2005) explored to what extent emotional intelligence (mixed model) can be 
expressed in terms of personality traits. To this end, he gathered a total of 437 items from emotional 
intelligence inventories. Sixty-six percent of the emotional intelligence descriptors could be 
classifi ed in a well-known Big Five framework (The Abridged Big Five-Dimensional Circumplex). 
The lion share of the terms was categorized under agreeableness and emotional stability. The main 
reason for items not being classifi able was that they were ambiguous because they were related 
to various Big Five factors. In other studies, the multiple correlation between Big Five scores and 
scores on mixed model emotional intelligence measures ranged between .75 and .79 (Brackett & 
Mayer, 2003; Grubb & McDaniel, 2007). However, other studies found incremental validity of the 
mixed model over and above personality (Law, Wong, & Song, 2004; Tett, Fox, & Wang, 2005). 
Nonetheless, in the scientifi c community, there have been calls to give up the mixed model (that is 
very popular in practice) and focus solely on the ability model (Daus & Ashkanasy, 2005).
The ability model is not without limitations either. For example, a large-scale examination of 
many emotional intelligence, cognitive intelligence, and personality measures showed that emotion 
perception (as represented by measures of perception of emotions in faces and pictures) was the only 
branch of the four branches of the ability model that could not be classifi ed under established mea-
sures (Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998). But even the emotion perception construct has drawbacks 
because the construct does not seem to have generalizability across different measures (Gohm, 
2004). That is, existing emotion perception measures correlate lowly among themselves (Roberts 
et al., 2006).
In comparing the fi ndings from the ability and the trait models, a major methodological problem 
exists because of a method-construct confound resulting from the fact that the ability model is 
often measured using performance-based tests whereas the trait model is often measured using 
self-reports. To advance research on the comparison of ability and trait models of emotional intel-
ligence (and also on the comparison of these models when applied to practical intelligence or social 
intelligence), rigorous designs that allow us to clearly isolate construct and method variances are 
needed (Chan & Schmitt, 2005).
SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE
Of the three intelligence constructs, social intelligence has the longest history. The idea goes back 
to Thorndike (1920), who defi ned social intelligence as “the ability to understand and manage 
men and women, boys and girls – to act wisely in human relations” (p. 228). As noted by Landy 
(2005), Thorndike did not build a theory of social intelligence but he only used the notion of 
social intelligence to clarify that intelligence could manifest itself in different facets (e.g., abstract. 
mechanical, social).
Social intelligence has a checkered history. Early studies tried to distinguish social intelligence 
from academic intelligence (e.g., Hoepener & O’Sullivan, 1968; Keating, 1978). However, these 
research efforts were unsuccessful. The problem was that measures of social intelligence did not 
correlate highly among themselves and that academic intelligence and social intelligence formed 
one factor. Methodologically, it was troublesome that both intelligences were measured with the 
same method (paper-and-pencil measures). The early research led to the conclusion that the “putative 
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domain of social intelligence lacks empirical coherency, at least as it is represented by the measures 
used here” (Keating, 1978, p. 221).
Two advancements led to more optimism. The fi rst was the distinction between cognitive social 
intelligence (e.g., social perception or the ability to understand or decode verbal and nonverbal 
behaviors of other persons) and behavioral social intelligence (effectiveness in social situations). 
Using this multidimensional defi nition of social intelligence and multiple measures (self, teacher, 
and peer ratings), Ford and Tisak (1983) were able to distinguish social intelligence from academic 
intelligence. In addition, social intelligence predicted social behavior better than academic intelligence 
(see also Marlowe, 1986). The second advancement was the use of multitrait-multimethod designs 
(and confi rmatory factor analysis) to obtain separate and unconfounded estimates of trait and 
method variance (Jones & Day, 1997; Wong, Day, Maxwell, & Meara, 1995).
These more sophisticated multitrait-multimethod designs have brought further evidence for 
the multidimensionality of social intelligence and for its discriminability vis-à-vis academic 
intelligence. For example, the aforementioned distinction made between cognitive social intelligence 
and behavioral social intelligence has been confi rmed (e.g., Wong et al., 1995). Similarly, a 
distinction is often made between fl uid and crystallized social intelligence. The fl uid form of social 
intelligence refers to social-cognitive fl exibility (the ability to fl exibly apply social knowledge in 
novel situations) or social inference. Conversely, a term such as social knowledge (knowledge of 
social etiquette, procedural and declarative social knowledge about social events) denotes the more 
crystallized component of social intelligence (Jones & Day, 1997). Despite these common fi ndings, 
the dimensions, the defi nitions, and measures of social intelligence still vary a lot across studies. Along 
these lines, Weis and Süss (2005) recently gave an excellent overview of the different facets of social 
intelligence that have been examined. This might form the basis to use a more uniform terminology 
when describing social intelligence subdimensions.
In recent years, interest in social intelligence has also known a renaissance under the general 
term of social effectiveness constructs. According to Ferris, Perrewé, and Douglas (2002), social 
effectiveness is a “broad, higher-order, umbrella term, which groups a number of moderately-
related, yet conceptually-distinctive, manifestations of social understanding and competence” (p. 50). 
Examples are social competence, self-monitoring, emotional intelligence, social skill, social 
deftness, practical intelligence, etc. The value of social skills has been especially scrutinized. 
Similar to social intelligence, social skills are posited to have a cognitive component (interpersonal 
perceptiveness) and a behavioral component (behavioral fl exibility; Riggio, 1986; Schneider, 
Ackerman, & Kanfer, 1996).
A key distinction between social skills and personality traits is that the former are learned (i.e., 
an ability), whereas the latter are relatively stable. Research has found that they are only moderately 
(.20) correlated (Ferris, Witt, & Hochwarter, 2001). However, both constructs are also related in 
that social skills enable personality traits to show their effects (Ferris et al., 2001; Hogan & Shelton, 
1998). Research has indeed confi rmed that social skills moderate the effects of personality traits 
(conscientiousness) on job performance (Witt & Ferris, 2003). Social skills were also found to have 
direct effects on managerial job performance, although personality and cognitive ability were not 
controlled for in most studies (Semadar, Robins, & Ferris, 2006).
CONCLUSIONS
Our review of practical, social, and emotional intelligence highlights that these three constructs 
share remarkable similarities. Specifi cally, we see at least three parallels. First, the origins and 
rationale behind each of the constructs can be summarized as “going beyond g.” Cognitively oriented 
measures of ability and achievement have been traditionally used in employment and educational 
contexts. However, at the same time, there has always been substantial interest in exploring possible 
supplemental (“alternative”) predictors for broadening the constructs measured and reducing possible 
adverse impact. Supplementing cognitive with alternative predictors is seen as a mechanism for 
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accomplishing this (Sackett, Schmitt, Ellingson, & Kabin, 2001). Whereas social intelligence is the 
oldest construct, practical intelligence came into fashion at the end of the 1980s. Since Goleman’s 
(1995) book, emotional intelligence is the newest fad. Every time, the construct was introduced as 
the panacea for the problem of an exclusive reliance on g. We agree that there is need to go beyond g 
and identify new and non-g constructs, but a new construct has little scientifi c explanatory and utility 
value if it is defi ned solely by negation (i.e., as non-g). Hence, good construct validity evidence for 
the three constructs is needed and the current state of research indicates to us that more rigorous 
construct validation studies are needed. Second, the conceptualizations of these three constructs 
have salient parallels. Each of these three constructs has various defi nitions, is multidimensional, and 
there exists debate about their different dimensions. Third, for each of these constructs, investigations 
of incremental validity over and above more established constructs such as cognitive ability and 
personality have been the focus of debate and research.
So, are there conceptual differences between the three constructs? According to Landy (2005), 
emotional intelligence as a so-called new construct has simply replaced the older notion of social 
intelligence. Similarly, Bowman et al. (2001) posited that “it is not certain to what extent tacit 
knowledge, social, and EQ measures are structurally independent” (p. 148). Although our review 
shows that these three constructs are defi nitely overlapping, it is possible to make at least some 
subtle distinctions. On the one hand, emotional intelligence might be somewhat narrower than 
social intelligence because it focuses on emotional problems embedded in social problems (Mayer & 
Salovey, 1993). That is probably why Salovey and Mayer (1990) defi ned emotional intelligence as 
a subset of social intelligence (p. 189). Conversely, one might also posit that emotional intelligence 
is broader than social intelligence because internal regulatory processes/emotions are also taken 
into account, something that is not the case in social intelligence. Practical intelligence with its 
emphasis on real-world problems is more distinct than the other two constructs because it makes no 
reference to interpersonal skills (Austin & Saklofske, 2005). Domain specifi city is another aspect 
of tacit knowledge that contrasts to the more generic nature of social and emotional intelligence. 
In any case, these conceptual distinctions are open to investigation because no study has explicitly 
examined the three constructs together (Weis & Süss, 2005).
MEASUREMENT APPROACHES
In the previous section, we showed that the conceptual debate around practical, social, and emotional 
intelligence shared many parallels. The same can be said about the measurement approaches used 
because the similarities in how practical intelligence, social intelligence, and emotional intelligence 
are measured are striking. Generally, six measurement approaches might be distinguished: (a) self-
reports, (b) other-reports, (c) interviews, (d) tests, (e) SJTs, and (f) assessment center exercises. 
The following discusses each of these approaches including their advantages and disadvantages. 
Examples of instruments are also given and these are summarized in Table 16.1.
SELF-REPORTS
The self-report approach presents respondents with descriptive statements and asks them to use 
a sort of rating scale to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with the respective 
statements. An important advantage of self-report measures is that they can be administered 
inexpensively and quickly to large groups of respondents.
Examples of the self-report approach are many. In fact, most examples of self-report emotional 
intelligence measures are based on the popular mixed model approach to emotional intelligence. 
Examples are the Emotional Competence Inventory (ECI; Sala, 2002), the Trait Meta-Mood Scale 
(TMMS; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995), EQ-I (Bar-On, 1997), and the Trait 
Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire (TEIQue; Petrides & Furnham, 2003). Other emotional 
intelligence measures are based on the four-branch model (or its predecessors) (Salovey & Mayer, 1990) 
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but use a self-report methodology (instead of performance-based tests) for measuring it. Examples 
are the Wong Law Emotional Intelligence Scale (WLEIS; Law et al., 2004; Wong & Law, 2002), 
the Multidimensional Emotional Intelligence Assessment (MEIA; Tett et al., 2005), the Swinburne 
University Emotional Intelligence Test (SUEIT; Palmer & Stough, 2001), or the Schutte Self-Report 
Emotional Intelligence Test (SREIT; Schutte et al., 1998). We refer to Pérez, Petrides, and Furnham 
(2005) for a comprehensive list of trait EQ measures. There are also self-report inventories of 
social intelligence/social skills (e.g., Ferris et al., 2001; Riggio, 1986; Schneider et al., 1996). We 
are not aware of self-report instruments (excluding SJTs as self-report measures) that assess tacit 
knowledge.
In the personality domain, there is a long history of using self-report measures and an equally 
long debate over its use. Clearly, the debate and issues concerning the use of self-report measures 
TABLE 16.1
Overview of Methods (Including Some Examples) for Measuring
Practical, Emotional, and Social Intelligence
Method
Ability Emotional 
Intelligence Model
Trait Emotional 
Intelligence Model Practical Intelligence Social Intelligence
Self-reports WLEIS• 
SREIT• 
MEIA• 
SUEIT• 
EQ-I• 
ECI• 
TMMS• 
TEIQue• 
Self-reports of • 
people’s behavior in 
everyday situations
Social skills • 
inventories
Other-reports Same as self-• 
reports
Workgroup • 
Emotional 
Intelligence Profi le 
Same as self-reports• Other-reports of • 
people’s behavior in 
everyday situations
Same as • 
self-reports
Performance-based 
tests
MSCEIT• 
DANVA2• 
PONS• 
JACBART• 
EARS• 
VOCAL-I• 
MSFDE• 
No known examples• Basic skills tests• LEAS• 
IPT-15• 
Four/six-factor • 
tests of social 
intelligence
Interviews Interview rating on • 
components of the 
four-branch model 
of Mayer, Salovey, 
and Caruso.
Interview rating on • 
mixed model 
emotional 
intelligence 
competencies 
(interpersonal 
sensitivity, stress 
tolerance, etc.)
Interview rating on • 
people’s reported 
behavior in everyday 
situations
Interview rating • 
on applied social 
skills
SJTs STEU• 
STEM• 
SJTs that aim to • 
measure mixed model 
emotional 
intelligence 
competencies
Tacit Knowledge • 
Inventories
George • 
Washington Social 
Intelligence Test 
(judgment in 
social situations)
ACs AC rating on • 
components of the 
four-branch model 
of Mayer, Salovey, 
and Caruso
AC rating on mixed • 
model emotional 
intelligence 
competencies
Case situational • 
problems
AC rating on • 
applied social 
skills
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in personality research is readily generalizable to the use of self-report measures in assessing social 
and emotional intelligence. A detailed review of the pros and cons of self-report measures is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. Suffi ce to say that self-report data are by no means perfect and it are 
in principle susceptible to various validity problems such as faking and infl ation of correlations 
because of common method variance. However, it is noteworthy that the severity of many of the 
purported problems of self-report data may be overstated (for details, see Chan, in press).
OTHER-REPORTS
Other-reports (or informant reports) have also been used for measuring emotional and social 
intelligence. One reason is that knowledgeable others might provide less lenient and more reliable 
measurement. Another reason is that multidimensional constructs such as emotional and social 
intelligence inherently have an important interpersonal component. Hence, it makes sense that in 
other-reports the same emotional and social intelligence scales as listed above are used, with others 
(peers, colleagues, teachers, parents, friends) now rating the focal person on descriptive statements. 
For example, peers or supervisors can also complete the ECI of Goleman. There also exist emo-
tional intelligence measures that were specifi cally developed for use in team settings. For instance, 
Jordan, Ashkanasy, Hartel, and Hooper (2002) developed a specifi c work group emotional 
intelligence measure, namely the Workgroup Emotional Intelligence Profi le.
Although there exists a much research supporting the use of peers in the personality domain 
(e.g., Borkenau & Liebler, 1993; Funder, 1987; Kenny, 1991), research with other-based emotional 
intelligence measures is relatively scarce. Van der Zee, Thijs, and Schakel (2002) confi rmed that 
peer ratings of emotional intelligence were more reliable. However, they also found that these peer 
ratings suffered from leniency. Law et al. (2004) reported that peer-reports of a trait-based emotional 
intelligence measure had substantial incremental validity over self-reports of emotional intelligence and 
personality. So, it seems benefi cial to use peers for mixed model emotional intelligence measures.
PERFORMANCE-BASED TESTS
Whereas both self-reports and peer-reports are assumed to be measures of typical performance, 
performance-based tests are posited to measure maximal performance. The rationale behind these 
tests parallels the one behind cognitive ability tests because these tests present people with social or 
emotion-based problem solving items. For example, in popular tests of emotion perception, individuals 
are presented with faces, voices, or pictures and are then asked to describe the emotions.
Historically, performance-based tests have been used for measuring social intelligence. An often-
cited example is O'Sullivan, Guilford, & deMille’s (1965) tests of social intelligence (see Landy, 
2006, for other older examples). A more modern example is the Levels of Emotional Awareness 
scale (LEAS; Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, & Zeitlin, 1990), although this test has also been 
used as a measure of emotional intelligence (e.g., Barchard, 2003). Similarly, the Interpersonal 
Perception Task-15 (IPT-15; Costanzo & Archer, 1993) is a performance-based measure that presents 
videotapes to participants.
Recently, these tests have known a renaissance in the context of the ability model of emo-
tional intelligence, with the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) as the 
best-known example. Other well-known examples are the Japanese and Caucasian Brief Affect 
Recognition Test (JACBART; Matsumoto et al., 2000), the Diagnostic Analysis of Nonverbal 
Accuracy (DANVA2; Nowicki, 2004), the Profi le of Nonverbal Sensitivity (PONS; Rosenthal, Hall, 
DiMatteo, Rogers, & Archer, 1979), the Emotional Accuracy Scale (EARS; Mayer & Geher, 1996), 
The Montreal Set of Facial Displays of Emotion (MSFDE; Beaupré, Cheung, & Hess, 2000), and 
the Index of Vocal Emotion Recognition (Vocal-I; Scherer, Banse, & Wallbott, 2001).
As noted by Spector and Johnson (2006), there is a difference between knowledge about 
emotions and the actual skill. It is not because one knows how to regulate one’s emotion in the face 
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of problems that one will also do this in an actual context. Using basic skills tests (Diehl, Willis, & 
Schaie, 1995) has circumvented this problem with regard to practical intelligence. These tests mea-
sure among others the ability to perform daily tasks such as cooking or using a bus schedule. 
Scoring constitutes another problem of performance-based tests. In contrast to cognitive ability 
tests, emotional intelligence tests using the ability model, for instance, do not have objectively 
correct answers.
INTERVIEWS
Interviews constitute another possible method for measuring practical, social, and emotional 
intelligence. In the past, especially social skills (social intelligence) have been frequently measured 
in interviews. This is demonstrated by the meta-analysis of Huffcutt, Conway, Roth, and Stone 
(2001), who reviewed the type of constructs most frequently targeted by interviews in 47 studies. 
Specifi cally, social skills were measured in 27.8% of the interviews. Moreover, applied skills were 
twice as frequently rated in high-structure interviews (behavior description interviews and situational 
interviews) as compared with low-structure interviews (34.1% vs. 17.7%).
Essentially, interviews are measurement methods that can be used to assess a wide variety of con-
structs. On the basis of multiple job-related questions, interviewees are asked to describe behavior that 
is relevant for constructs deemed important. Therefore, interviews could also be used for measuring 
practical intelligence (Fox & Spector, 2000) and emotional intelligence (mixed model; Schmit, 2006). 
Schmit notes how interview questions can try to elicit situations from interviewees wherein they had 
to recognize emotions of others and how they dealt with this. Yet in interviews observable samples of 
behavior can be observed only for specifi c dimensions (e.g., interpersonal skills or oral communication 
skills; Van Iddekinge, Raymark, & Roth, 2005). For other dimensions, candidates report past behavior 
(in behavior description interviews) or intended behavior (in situational interviews).
SJTS
SJTs might be another approach for measuring practical, social, and emotional intelligence (Chan, 
2000, 2006; O’Sullivan, 2007; Schulze, Wilhelm, & Kyllonen, 2007). SJTs are measurement 
methods that present respondents with job-related situations and sets of alternate courses of action 
to these situations. For each situation, respondents either select the best and worst options or rate 
each of the alternative actions in terms of its effectiveness. Because respondents have to respond to 
realistic (written and especially video-based) scenarios, SJTs might constitute a more contextualized 
(ecologically valid) way of measuring practical, social, and emotional intelligence. This judgment 
in a realistic context contrasts to the decontextualized nature of standardized tests. Technological 
advancements make it possible to develop interactive SJTs that present different video fragments on 
the basis of responses to earlier video fragments. This allows the SJT to simulate the dynamics of 
interaction. Similar to emotional intelligence tests (ability model), multiple-choice SJTs are scored 
using expert (excellent employees) or empirical (large pilot samples) grounds.
Over the years, SJTs have been developed for measuring each of the three constructs. First, as 
noted by McDaniel, Morgeson, Finnegan, Campion, and Braverman (2001), the fi rst SJTs were 
social intelligence tests, namely the Judgment in Social Situations subtest of the George Washington 
Social Intelligence Test. Second, instruments very similar to SJTs are used under the label “tacit 
knowledge tests” for measuring practical intelligence (Sternberg et al., 1995). Examples are the 
Tacit-Knowledge Inventory for Managers or the Tacit-Knowledge Inventory for Military Leaders. 
Third, recent research has explored the use of SJTs for measuring two branches of Mayer and 
Salovey’s emotional intelligence model. Specifi cally, MacCann, and Roberts (2007) developed 
the Situational Test of Emotional Understanding (STEU) and the Situational Test of Emotion 
Management (STEM). There have also been recent attempts to develop video-based SJTs for 
measuring emotional intelligence (Bedwell & Chuah, 2007).
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SJTs are also referred to as low-fi delity simulations. Although they aim to provide a more 
ecologically valid approach for measuring practical, social, and emotional intelligence, they do not 
require candidates to actually show how they would handle a specifi c situation. Candidates have 
to pick the "correct" answer from a limited set of predetermined response options. Nevertheless, 
a meta-analysis of McDaniel et al. (2001) found a corrected correlation between SJTs and job 
performance in employment settings of .34. In addition, recent research (Chan & Schmitt, 2002; 
McDaniel, Hartman, Whetzel, & Grubb, 2007) provided evidence for the incremental validity of 
SJTs in predicting job performance over and above the prediction provided by cognitive ability and 
personality. Other validity research also found that video-based SJTs are more valid than written 
ones (Lievens & Sackett, 2006).
An interesting aspect of SJTs is that differences in mean SJT scores between racial subgroups 
are typically smaller than those reported for cognitive ability tests. The meta-analysis of Nguyen, 
Biderman, and McDaniel (2005) found a difference in mean SJT scores between Whites and Blacks 
of about .30 SD in favor of White candidates, which is much smaller than the 1.00 SD typically 
found for cognitive ability tests (Jensen, 1998). A key determinant of whether SJTs show adverse 
impact is the correlation of SJTs with cognitive ability. Yet, it should be noted that the lower 
reliability of SJTs might also partially explain the lower subgroup differences found.
SJTs are inherently multidimensional because SJT items may refer to a range of situations and 
include different types of content to which applicants attend when making a decision. In addition, 
responses to SJT items with multiple options are the result of a combination of ability, experience, 
and personality (McDaniel et al., 2001; McDaniel & Whetzel, 2005). The multidimensional nature 
of SJTs makes it often diffi cult to assess what they exactly measure. For instance, factor analytic 
research on SJTs typically reveals a plethora of factors that are diffi cult to interpret (Chan & 
Schmitt, 2005).
ASSESSMENT CENTER EXERCISES
A fi nal possible approach for measuring practical, social, and interpersonal intelligence consists of 
putting people in a simulated situation, observing their actual behavior, and then making inferences 
about their standing on the construct of interest. Performance (or authentic) assessment is often used 
as a general term for describing this strategy. In industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology, this 
contextualized approach focusing on actual behavior is exemplifi ed by assessment centers (ACs). 
In ACs, several job-related simulations (e.g., role-play, interview simulation, in-basket, group 
discussion) aim to elicit behavior relevant to the constructs under investigation. The assumption is 
that individuals’ responses to these simulations refl ect the responses that they would exhibit in the 
real world. Multiple trained assessors observe and rate the candidates on these constructs.
According to Gowing (2001), the roots of the measurement of social, practical, and emotional 
intelligence can be traced to this AC approach. Although these constructs are not explicitly mea-
sured in AC exercises, they correspond well to the typically competencies targeted by AC exercises. 
In particular, some AC competencies such as fl exibility, awareness for others, interpersonal skills, 
fl exibility, stress tolerance, and communication have clear resemblances with practical, emotional, 
and social intelligence. The context sensitivity of what constitutes good performance in AC 
exercises and the ease with which situations may temporally unfold or change through injecting 
novel demands as the exercise progresses are features of the AC that make it a useful method for 
measuring the adaptability competencies associated with practical, emotional, and social intelligence 
(Chan, 2000).
Several researchers have explicitly related the measurement of these AC dimensions to the 
measurement of the one or more of the three intelligence constructs. Specifi cally, Spector and 
Johnson (2006) presented various examples of how AC exercises might be adapted for measuring 
emotional intelligence. For example, in a role-play, a participant might be asked to deal with an irate 
customer or to comfort an upset colleague. Assessors might then rate the assessees on broad-based 
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competencies or on more detailed verbal/nonverbal behaviors. Another example is Stricker and 
Rock’s (1990) Interpersonal Competency Inventory (ICI), wherein participants have to respond 
orally to videotaped scenes. Similarly, Sternberg and colleagues have argued that the typical AC 
exercises are very useful for assessing practical intelligence. For example, Hedlund, Wilt, Nebel, 
Ashford, and Sternberg (2006) developed so-called “case scenario problems” as a skill-based 
measure of practical intelligence. These case scenario problems consist of a fi ctitious business case 
wherein participants are given information such as the history of the organization, their role, memos, 
e-mails, and fi nancial tables. Individuals have to use their practical intelligence (practical problem-
solving skills) to solve these contextual and poorly defi ned problems. Clearly, this methodology is 
very similar to the in-basket format that has been used for decades in ACs.
Although the emphasis on simulations and actual behavior results in good AC validities (Arthur, 
Day, McNelly, & Edens, 2003) and little adverse impact (Terpstra, Mohamed, & Kethley, 1999), 
the quality of construct measurement remains the Achilles heel of ACs (Lance, Lambert, Gewin, 
Lievens, & Conway, 2004). Ratings of the same competency do not converge well across exercises 
(i.e., poor convergent validity). In addition, there is little distinction between dimensions within 
a specifi c exercise because within-exercise dimension ratings are highly correlated (i.e., poor 
discriminant validity).
CONCLUSIONS
Our review of measurement approaches suggests parallels in how the three constructs are measured. 
Although it is often thought that the three constructs are primarily measured with self-reports and 
performance tests, this section highlighted that there are a wide array of other options possible. 
Specifi cally, interviews, peer-reports, and instruments with somewhat more fi delity (e.g., SJTs and 
AC exercises) are viable measurement approaches. Future research should explore these alternative 
measurement methods.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING PRACTICAL, 
EMOTIONAL, AND SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE
In Figure 16.1, we present a conceptual framework that we adapted from Chan and Schmitt (2005) 
to organize the discussion and guide future research on the validity of practical, emotional, and 
social intelligence. Following Chan and Schmitt, the framework construes all three types of 
intelligence as competencies that are multidimensional constructs, each of which is a partial mediator 
of the predictive or causal effect of unidimensional knowledge, skills, abilities, and other charac-
teristics (KSAOs) on job performance or other job-relevant criteria. In addition, our framework 
construes the three types of intelligences as distinct but related competencies with common and 
unique construct space as depicted by the three overlapping circles representing practical, emotional, 
and social intelligence.
The framework in Figure 16.1 shows that proponents and opponents of each of these three 
constructs are right and wrong in different ways. Specifi cally, the opponents typically focus on the 
KSAOs and correctly argue that practical, emotional, and social intelligences are not factorally pure 
(unitary) KSAOs, but they incorrectly dismissed the validities and value of these intelligence 
constructs. Conversely, the proponents typically focus on the multidimensional competencies and 
correctly argue that practical, emotional, and social intelligences are proximal (and hence sometimes 
better) predictors of performance and other criteria, but they incorrectly ignore the important role 
of KSAOs in determining the nature of these intelligence constructs.
Our framework is consistent with and may reconcile several extant fi ndings and the debate over 
the value of the three types of intelligence. For example, each of the three intelligence constructs is 
inherently multidimensional in the sense that it is conceptualized as a multidimensional competency 
resulting from a combination of several different individual difference constructs. The relationships 
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linking each type of intelligence and the various individual difference constructs explain the 
consistent fi ndings from factor analytic studies that the intelligence measure is factorially complex 
and the data from the measure do not produce good fi t with a single factor model. These relationships 
also explain the signifi cant and sometimes substantial correlations between the intelligence mea-
sure and the established measures of traditional KSAOs such as cognitive ability and personality 
traits. In addition, these relationships provide the conceptual bases for examining ability models, 
trait models, and mixed models of emotional (as well as practical or social) intelligence.
The fi ndings on the substantial zero-order validities and incremental validities of practical intelli-
gence in predicting job performance over the prediction provided by cognitive ability and personality 
traits (e.g., Chan & Schmitt, 2002) are consistent with the proximal status of practical intelligence 
competencies (relative to the distal status of KSAOs) in the prediction of job performance. Similarly, 
the proximal status of emotional and social intelligence also explains the fi ndings from studies that 
showed zero-order and incremental validities of these intelligence measures in the prediction of job 
performance and other criteria (for meta-analytic review of studies, see Druskat & Jordan, 2007). 
Interestingly, Figure 16.1 may also explain why SJTs and ACs, which are multidimensional measures, 
do better than factorially pure measures of single unitary constructs (e.g., cognitive ability, personality) 
in predicting job-relevant performance criteria, which are often multidimensional in nature. That is, 
much of what SJTs and ACs are assessing may well be multidimensional competencies similar, if 
not identical, to practical, emotional, and social intelligence.
We believe the conceptual framework in Figure 16.1 is consistent with existing fi ndings and 
reconciles much of the debate on the validity of practical, emotional, and social intelligence, 
but more direct empirical support of the framework is certainly needed. We reiterate the call in 
Chan and Schmitt (2005) that to obtain more direct evidence for a framework that construes the 
intelligence competencies as multidimensional mediators in the relationship between KSAOs and 
job performance (and other criteria), we would need to specify and test hypothesized and alternative 
structural equation models (on the basis of primary data from a single study or cumulation of 
results from past studies using meta-analyses) linking KSAOs, intelligence competencies, and job 
performance or other criterion outcomes. Future research could derive theory-driven specifi c models 
from the general framework depicted in Figure 16.1 to empirically examine the validity of one or 
more of the three intelligence constructs that would facilitate the interpretation of the correlations 
Individual diﬀerence
constructs
(KSAOs)
Cognitive abilities
Personality traits
Cognitive styles
Values
Motivational constructs
Experience
Job knowledge
Job performance and
other criterion
constructs
Task performance
Contextual performance
Adaptive performance
Withdrawal behaviors
Counterproductive
behaviors
Practical
intelligence
Emotional
intelligence
Social
intelligence
FIGURE 16.1 Conceptual framework for examining practical, emotional, and social intelligence. (Adapted 
from Chan, D., & Schmitt, N., Situational judgment tests, in A. Evers, O. Smit-Voskuijl, & N. Anderson, Eds., 
Handbook of personnel selection, 219–242, Blackwell, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2005.)
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between the intelligence construct and more established individual difference KSAOs, as well as the 
zero-order and incremental validities of the intelligence construct in predicting different criterion 
outcomes. In the following section, we suggest various strategies for formulating theory-driven 
testable models that are likely to advance research in ways that make conceptual and practical 
contributions to the study of practical, emotional, and social intelligence.
STRATEGIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
We suggest the following fi ve strategies for future research on the three types of intelligence: (a) matching 
predictor and criterion, (b) disentangling methods and constructs, (c) going beyond bivariate relation-
ships, (d) using longitudinal validation designs, and (e) adopting a multilevel perspective.
MATCHING BETWEEN PREDICTOR AND CRITERION
An important development in personnel selection research is the movement away from general 
discussions of predictors as “valid” to consideration of “valid for what?”. This development of more 
nuanced questions about predictor-criterion relationships was spurred by the taxonomic work on job 
performance led by Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, and Sager (1993) that differentiated performance 
into multiple distinct dimensions. Since then, selection researchers have signifi cantly expanded 
the notion of job performance to include distinct performance dimensions such as those listed in the 
criterion space of the framework in Figure 16.1. The expansion of the defi nition of performance and 
recognition of the multidimensional nature of performance led to streams of research demonstrating 
that different predictor constructs and selection tests will offer optimal predictive validity depending 
on the performance dimension(s) of interest (Chan, 2005a). For example, research has shown that 
task performance is better predicted by cognitive ability tests, whereas contextual performance is 
better predicted by personality tests (McHenry, Hough, Toquam, Hanson, & Ashworth, 1990). The 
key message here is that one needs to carefully attend to the constructs underlying both predictors 
and criterion dimensions in developing hypotheses about predictor-criterion relationships.
Unfortunately, research on practical, social, and emotional intelligence has typically ignored 
linking these constructs to relevant criterion variables (Landy, 2005). These constructs are often 
proposed to predict almost everything. Probably, this is best exemplifi ed by studies investigating the 
validity of emotional intelligence for predicting academic performance (e.g., Amelang & Steinmayr, 
2006; Barchard, 2003; Jaeger, 2003; Newsome, Day, & Catano, 2000; Parker, Hogan, Eastabrook, 
Oke, & Wood, 2006). There is no clear theoretical basis or conceptual match between emotional 
intelligence and grade point average (GPA). Clearly, emotional intelligence will have at best mod-
erate predictive value for predicting an omnibus cognitively loaded criterion such as GPA. Hence, 
we need studies that carefully match the three intelligence constructs and their subdimensions to 
relevant criteria. For example, trait emotional intelligence might be a good predictor of courses 
that require teamwork instead of cumulative GPA (see also Lievens, Buyse, & Sackett, 2005) and 
satisfaction at school.
Referring to Figure 16.1, we could apply the conceptual matching between predictor and criterion 
to foster our understanding of the link between the three intelligence constructs and the difference 
dimensions of job performance. For instance, task performance might be predicted by ability-based 
emotional intelligence, whereas contextual performance might be predicted by trait-based emotional 
intelligence. As another example, practical intelligence might predict adaptive performance better 
than it predicts routine task performance.
DISENTANGLING METHODS AND CONSTRUCTS
In recent years, there is increased recognition that methods should be distinguished from constructs 
in the comparative evaluation of predictors (Arthur & Villado, in press; Arthur et al., 2003; Bobko, 
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Roth, & Potosky, 1999; Chan & Schmitt, 1997, 2005; Lievens, Harris, Van Keer, & Bisqueret, 
2003). Constructs refer to the substantive conceptual variables (e.g., conscientiousness, cognitive 
ability, fi nger dexterity, fi eld dependence-independence, reaction time, visual attention, emotional 
intelligence) that the measures were designed to assess. Conversely, methods refer to the tests, 
techniques, or procedures (e.g., paper-and-pencil tests, computer-administered tests, video-based 
tests, interviews, ACs, self-reports, peer reports) used to assess the intended constructs. This 
distinction between constructs and methods is especially crucial for multidimensional predictors 
(Bobko et al., 1999). Conceptual and methodological issues of variance partition associated with the 
construct-method distinction and their applications to constructs such as practical intelligence are 
available in Chan and Schmitt (2005).
Given the multidimensional nature of practical, social, and emotional intelligence, clarity of the 
method-construct distinction is critical. As shown in Table 16.1, practical, social, and emotional 
intelligence might be measured in multiple ways. As noted above, recent research on social intel-
ligence has adopted such multitrait-multimethod design and cleared some of the confusion around 
this construct. For example, social intelligence constructs (e.g., social understanding, memory, and 
knowledge) were operationalized in a multitrait-multimethod design applying verbal, pictorial, and 
video-based performance measures.
A similar strategy could be followed for clarifying some of the confusion related to emotional 
intelligence. So far, research mainly compared self-reports of ability-based emotional intelligence 
or mixed model emotional intelligence to personality inventories (see Roberts et al., 2006, for 
an exception). However, many more strategies are possible. One possibility is to operationalize a 
specifi c branch of the emotional intelligence ability model via different measurement approaches 
(Wilhelm, 2005). For example, the emotion understanding branch of the ability model might be 
measured via the MSCEIT and an SJT. Similarly, the emotion perception branch might be mea-
sured via faces, pictures, movies, voices, etc. As another example, people might complete an ability 
emotional intelligence test, they might provide self-reports of their emotional intelligence, and they 
might be rated by trained assessors on emotional intelligence (or conceptually similar competencies 
such as interpersonal sensitivity) in AC exercises. Such research designs (see also Landy, 2006) 
focus on convergent validity and enable one to answer key questions such as the following:
How well do these different methods converge in assessing emotional intelligence?• 
How much variance is accounted for by method factors and how much variance is accounted • 
for by substantive construct factors?
What does this tell us about the construct?• 
It is important to distinguish between methods and constructs because comparative evaluations 
of predictors might be meaningful only when one either (a) holds the method constant and varies 
the content, or (b) holds the constructs constant and varies the method. This is another reason why 
it is crucial to operationalize emotional intelligence constructs via multiple methods. Moreover, 
it shifts the attention from measures to constructs (Matthews et al., 2004). Similarly, the need to 
include diversity in measurement also applies to the criterion side (see also Figure 16.1) because 
most studies on trait emotional intelligence are prone to common method variance (predictors and 
criteria are measured with the same method, namely self-reports). We need studies that link the 
three intelligence constructs to objective measures of the various performance constructs.
GOING BEYOND BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS
Current personnel selection research has gone beyond documenting simple bivariate relationships 
between individual difference predictor and job performance criterion to examine mediator and 
moderator relationships. Identifying mediators in the predictor-criterion relationship increases 
our understanding of the prediction and helps in the search for alternative predictors or design of 
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interventions that infl uence individuals’ scores on the criteria (by understanding what might affect 
the mediator). Research could attempt to explicate the precise affective, cognitive, motivational, and 
behavioral mechanisms that mediate the effects of practical, emotional, or social intelligence on the 
criterion and directly measure and test these hypothesized mediation mechanisms. For example, 
cognitions and motivations (expectancy and instrumentality beliefs), or more subtle mediators (like-
ability) may mediate the intelligence effects on criteria such as job satisfaction and performance.
When an intelligence construct interacts with another predictor (e.g., personality trait) to affect 
the criterion, the interaction effect is mathematically equivalent whether we select intelligence or 
the other predictor as the moderator. However, conceptually, which predictor is selected as the 
moderator refl ects different research questions. Identifying moderators that affect the magnitude 
and even nature of the relationship between the intelligence and criterion constructs is important as 
the moderator effect clarifi es the range and boundary conditions of the predictive validity of the 
intelligence construct. There has been increasing research examining moderator effects in the 
predictive validity of personality traits (e.g., Barrick, Parks, & Mount, 2005). However, in the domain 
of practical, emotional, and social intelligence, research on moderator effects on their validity is still 
scarce. For instance, Côté and Miners (2006) found that emotional intelligence was linked to task 
performance and OCB toward the organization only for people low on cognitive ability. Another 
rare example is Ferris et al. (2001), who reported that the relationship between social intelligence and 
job performance was stronger among workers high rather than low in cognitive ability. On the other 
hand, when the intelligence construct is the moderator affecting the relationship between another 
predictor and the criterion, the importance of the intelligence construct is demonstrated not in terms 
of its bivariate predictive validity of the criterion, but in terms of its role in determining the range and 
boundary conditions of the bivariate predictive validity of another predictor. Several studies have 
demonstrated important moderator roles of practical, emotional, and social intelligence constructs. 
For example, Witt and Ferris (2003) found that the conscientiousness-performance relationship was 
moderated by social intelligence in that high levels of conscientiousness together with poor social 
intelligence led to lower performance. Chan (2006) found that proactive personality predicts work 
perceptions (procedural justice perception, perceived supervisor support, social integration) and 
work outcomes (job satisfaction, affective organizational commitment, job performance) positively 
among individuals with high practical intelligence (construed in terms of situational judgment 
effectiveness) but negatively among those with low practical intelligence. The fi ndings on the 
disordinal interaction effects show that high levels of proactive personality may be either adaptive or 
maladaptive depending on the individual’s level of practical intelligence and caution against direct 
interpretations of bivariate associations between proactive personality and work-relevant criteria. In 
short, fruitful future research could be conducted by adopting a strategy that goes beyond bivariate 
relationships to examine the mediators that link the intelligence construct to the criterion construct, 
the moderators that affect the nature of the intelligence-criterion relationship, and the role of the 
intelligence construct as a moderator affecting the nature of a predictor-criterion relationship.
USING LONGITUDINAL VALIDATION DESIGNS
The time spans over which criteria are gathered for validation studies often refl ect practical 
considerations. In predictive studies, the time period selected for the criterion rarely exceeds a year 
or two. Validation studies of practical intelligence, social intelligence, or emotional intelligence are 
no exception. As such, criterion-related validities reported for these three constructs may or may not 
accurately estimate the long-term validities associated with these constructs. That is, early perfor-
mance may not be refl ective of typical performance over an individual’s tenure in an organizational 
or educational context, and if so, early validation efforts would provide misleading results.
In the personnel selection domain, research has shown that predictors of job performance might 
differ across job stages. Along these lines, the transitional job stage at which there is a need to 
learn new things is typically contrasted to the more routine maintenance job stage (Murphy, 1989). 
AQ1
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For instance, Thoresen, Bradley, Bliese, and Thoresen (2004) found that openness was related to 
performance and performance trends in the transition stage but not to performance at the maintenance 
stage. As another example, Jansen and Stoop (2001) discovered that the AC dimension of interpersonal 
effectiveness showed validity only after several years on the job.
We believe that future studies on practical, social, and emotional intelligence should also adopt a 
longitudinal design where possible. Similar to personality, it might well be that the validity of these 
intelligence constructs differs in the long run for predicting job performance. For example, the 
transitional job stage typically involves more adaptive demands than the routine maintenance job 
stage. So, practical intelligence might predict job performance stronger in the transitional job stage 
than in the routine maintenance job stage.
A construct-oriented approach to the study of practical, emotional, and social intelligence that 
locates the constructs in the framework presented in Figure 16.1 would provide the conceptual basis 
to hypothesize, test, and interpret performance changes over time. Using appropriate longitudinal 
designs and change assessment techniques allows one to draw practical implications for key issues 
such as changes in test validities, changes in mean performance, changes in rank order of individu-
als’ performance, and changes in dimensionality (i.e., number and/or nature of dimensions) of 
performance (see Chan, 1998a, 2005a).
ADOPTING A MULTILEVEL PERSPECTIVE
In many contexts, personnel selection researchers have to move beyond the individual level to 
consider variables at the higher levels (e.g., group, organization) of analysis. For example, a study 
concerned with identifying individual difference variables that predict work group performance 
has to deal with constructs and data at the individual and group levels of analysis. In the conceptual 
framework presented in Figure 16.1, the three intelligence constructs, and all of the other constructs 
in the individual difference and criterion spaces could be conceptualized, measured, and analyzed 
in multiple levels of analysis (e.g., individual, group, organization).
So far, the research on practical, emotional, and social intelligence has not adopted a multilevel 
approach. With the increasing reliance on the use of teams to accomplish work in various organizations, 
the relevant job performance criteria are often at the higher level (e.g., team, organization) than the indi-
vidual level of analysis. When each of the three intelligence constructs is examined as predictors in the 
multilevel context of staffi ng teams or organizations and relating them to job performance at the indi-
vidual, team, and organizational levels, we would need appropriate composition models (Chan, 1998b) 
that explicate the functional relationships linking the same intelligence constructs at the different levels 
of analysis so that we have clear conceptual understanding of what is meant by team social intelligence 
and how to measure and analyze social intelligence at the team level. Unlike the traditional KSAOs, 
which are single unitary constructs, the multidimensional nature of the practical, emotional, and social 
intelligence constructs would pose challenges to multilevel research because of the increased diffi culty 
in formulating and testing appropriate composition models for these intelligence constructs.
Multilevel constructs and data bring with them complex conceptual, measurement, and data 
analysis issues and discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this chapter (for reviews, see 
Chan, 1998b, 2005b). Our basic point is that a multilevel approach is a strategy for future research 
on practical, emotional, and social intelligence that is not just desirable but probably necessary, 
given the inherently multilevel nature of the criteria of interest (e.g., team performance) that are 
emerging in personnel selection research.
EPILOGUE
We have, under the constraint of a relatively short chapter length, critically reviewed the vast literature on 
practical, emotional, and social intelligence constructs. We have proposed a conceptual framework, 
adapted from Chan and Schmitt (2005), which provides a way to organize the conceptualizations 
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of the intelligence constructs and their relationships with other individual difference and criterion 
constructs. We believe that this framework also reconciles some if not most of the fi ndings and 
debates in the literature on the intelligence constructs. Finally, by explicating several strategies for 
future research, we hope that more scientifi cally rigorous studies could be conducted on practical, 
emotional, and social intelligence to provide practitioners in personnel selection and other HR 
functions a more evidence-based basis for the use of these intelligence constructs and measures.
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